Form Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
Affected Service Members
The Naval Inspector General's office defines identity theft The adversity experienced by both of these men was significant; however, it is not difficult to imagine how much more complicated each scenario would have been if the service theft threat. This argument is convincingly countered when the very nature of the threat is considered. The force protection vulnerability represented by identity theft will only grow as mass amounts of data continue to be propagated via the Internet and as the technical means of retrieving and exploiting that data becomes more accessible to criminals. As a result, the number of Americans that fall prey to identity theft will increase and by extension, the number of military personnel affected will also increase. The financial, man-hour, and readiness costs paid by the DoD over time will exceed similar factors associated with a conversion.
Institutional models for successfully converting SSNs to unique identification numbers are currently available in business, state government, and academia. Some organizations, such as small colleges or universities, have initiated the change while incurring only a modest cost in time and money.
Other institutions have undergone the conversion at a cost that is more comparable to that which might be realized by the DoD.
In all instances, however, each model must be carefully scrutinized for strategies and solutions that could be templated for a DoD model. For example, the University of Oregon recently initiated a three to five-year plan for a one-time conversion to unique identification numbers at an estimated cost of $90,000. an average financial cost of $90,000 for each name used and 600 hours in time lost, the total adverse impact on personnel readiness can be estimated to be $10 billion and 67.3 million hours.
Conclusion
The force protection threat represented by identity theft is profound and must be aggressively addressed within the DoD.
The use of the SSN as a service member identification number represents a significant vulnerability that mandates a reversal of the 1967 decision that implemented the current policy. Any conversion of the current identification system will prove to be both time-intensive and costly. However, these impacts do not exceed the long-term financial, man-hour, and readiness costs that will be paid over time by the DoD and individual service members alike. The sophistication and number of identity thieves is increasing and sensitive data, like the SSN, will continue to put the military at risk as long as the current policy remains unchanged.
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